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PATENTING IMPROVEMENTS: THE COSTS OF
MAKING PATENTS EASILY AVAILABLE
Douglas A. Applegatet
ABSTRACT
This article examines the economic costs that arise when pat-
ents are issued for improvements to previously patented inventions.
These costs arise when an inventor patents an improvement on an
earlier invention which the earlier inventor could have discovered
for herself. The case law on combination patents provides some in-
sight into these economic costs, and suggests that an inventor's pat-
ent monopoly should include an additional limited monopoly on
improvements to her invention.
This article first discusses the law's view of the inventive pro-
cess, and examines how that view has historically shaped the availa-
bility of patent protection. The article next discusses Congress's
choice of a looser standard of patentability in 1952, and examines
how this standard meshes with the economic underpinnings of the
patent system. Finally, this article examines the economic costs
that accompany the looser standard of patentability, and proposes
an additional code section to separately govern patents on improve-
ments to previously patented inventions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the middle decades of this century, courts viewed patent ap-
plications with a harsh eye, insisting that new inventions display a
spark of genius that went beyond the work of mere technicians or
mechanics.' In 1952, Congress enacted § 103 of the patent code,2
replacing the previous judicial inquiries into the metaphysics of in-
vention with a statutory requirement that a new invention be "non-
obvious." In enacting § 103, Congress hoped to make patents more
readily available.3
Most scholars have agreed that Congress's desire to make pat-
ents more readily available better serves the economic goals of our
patent system.4 In providing a looser standard for the issuance of
new patents, however, Congress also limited the protection afforded
to existing patents, since one patent's protection ends where an-
other's may begin. Chief among the costs caused by this looser
standard are the costs of having multiple inventors haggle over the
property rights to a new consumer product. Economists refer to
these increased transaction costs as bilateral monopoly costs, and
they occur in the patent system most often when a later inventor
patents an improvement on an earlier invention.
This article first discusses the patent law's view of the inventive
process, and examines how that view has historically shaped the
availability of patent protection. This article next discusses Con-
gress's intent in enacting § 103, and further discusses how Con-
gress's choice of a looser standard of patentability meshes with the
economic underpinnings of the patent system. Finally, this article
examines the economic costs that accompany the current looser
1. See discussion infra part I, and cases cited infra notes 8 and 9. See also Potts v.
Coe, 145 F.2d 27, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1944): "[A] discovery which is the result of step-by-step
experimentation does not rise to the level of invention; .. ." See generally Frank D. Prager,
Standards of Patentable Invention From 1474 to 1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1952-53).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1992).
3. See discussion infra part II.
4. See, eg., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L.
& ECON. 265 (1977) and discussion infra part III.
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standard of patentability, and concludes that the current statutory
scheme is lacking; an inventor's patent monopoly should include an
additional limited monopoly on improvements to his invention.
I. THE INVENTIVE PROCESS: MARKET AND NON-MARKET
INVENTIONS
The inventor was, however, encouraged in his efforts by the
reflection that that which is hidden and unknown and cannot be
discovered by scientific research, will most likely be discovered
by accident, if at all...
-Charles Goodyear, 1855. 5
The law has traditionally recognized that invention is partly a
sporadic, unpredictable and even unconscious process. The follow-
ing passage from Joseph-Marie Montmasson's book on the cogni-
tive process of invention illustrates this idea:
In Newton's case, sitting under his apple tree, it was a flash
of identification between solar and terrestrial attraction; . . .
Without thinking about it, Torricelli made use of a barometer
when he wished to test the pressure of the atmosphere; ... In
Daguerre's case it was the perception of the connection between
the existence of mercury vapour and the appearance of the image
on a photographic plate; this glimpse of a causal connection was
a surprise, . . . Without thinking about it, Malus turned his
prism between his fingers; and, after performing this movement
unconsciously, he suddenly formulated his hypothesis on the po-
larization of light.6
Judges have long struggled to capture in words this sporadic
aspect of invention. An early court looked for "creative work in the
inventive faculty."7 To Justice Douglas, invention was revealed in a
"flash of creative genius;"8 and for a while, courts struggled to de-
termine when that flash had occurred.9 Many courts, however,
found that it was easier to determine what was not invention. The
5. J. A. ALLEN, SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY 9-10 (1967)
(citing J. JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 59 (1958)).
6. JOSEPH-MARIE MONTMASSON, INVENTION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 115-16
(1932).
7. Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885).
8. "That is to say, the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of
creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to
a private grant on the public domain." Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314
U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
9. See, e.g., Carlson v. Betmar Hats, 47 F. Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Wallace v. F.
W. Woolworth Co., 45 F. Supp. 465, 466-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 133 F.2d 763 (2nd Cir.
1943), and cert. denied, 320 U.S. 739 (1943); Pennington Eng'g Co. v. Houde Eng'g Co., 43
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court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,"° for example, denied a patent to a
method for manufacturing door knobs that consisted merely of sub-
stituting ceramic for metal, stating:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill... were required.., than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which
constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words,
the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of
the inventor."
These various approaches to determining when invention oc-
curred show the patent law's perception that new developments are
of two principal types. There are, on the one hand, those inventions
which are available only from the few individuals possessing the
appropriate inventive genius-what this article calls non-market in-
ventions. 2 These inventions have always been provided patent
protection.
Additionally, there are inventions which can be purchased
from any of a number of ordinary mechanics-what this article
calls market available inventions. Historically, these inventions
were not granted patent protection, either because the flash of in-
ventive genius was lacking, or because the improvement was merely
the work of a mechanic, not an inventor. When Congress enacted
§ 103, however, it opened the possibility that even market available
inventions could receive patent protection.
II. SECTION 103
Congress enacted section 103 of the patent laws in 1952, for
the first time establishing a statutory nonobviousness requirement
for the issuance of patents. In relevant part, § 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentabil-
F. Supp. 698, 713 (W.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 136 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1943), and cert. denied,
320 U.S. 771 (1943).
10. 52 U.S. 248 (1851).
11. Id. at 267.
12. Compare Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, 188 U.S. 239 (1903), in which the
court extended copyright protection to commercially prepared advertising lithographs. Jus-
tices Harlan and McKenna, dissenting, felt the law should recognize the fundamental distinc-
tion between unique works of art and routine commercial art, and deny copyright protection
to the latter.
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ity shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.13
In enacting § 103, Congress trumped the common law requirements
of patentability, and sought to make patent protection more readily
available to inventors. Significantly, courts no longer had to search
for a flash of creative genius.1 4
P.J. Federico, a Patent Office examiner-in-chief and one of the
principal drafters of § 103, noted that Congress deliberately chose
moderate language for § 103, in the hope that courts would likewise
moderate their strict approach to granting patent protection to new
inventions. 5 Likewise, Judge Rich, chairman of the § 103 drafting
committee, is said to have approved Federico's nonobviousness test
"for the two purposes of (1) moderating the extreme strictness to-
ward patents exhibited by the mid-century Supreme Court and
(2) eliminating the incredible tangle of patentability tests.' 16 As
Federico wrote:
While it is not believed that Congress intended any radical
change in the level of invention or patentable novelty, neverthe-
less, it is believed that some modification was intended in the
direction of moderating the extreme degrees of strictness exhib-
ited by a number of judicial opinions over the past dozen or more
years; that is, that some change of attitude more favorable to pat-
ents was hoped for. 17
Congress implicitly reaffirmed its call for greater generosity in
the granting of patents when, in 1982, it created the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and limited the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals."8 As noted by
Professors Kitch and Perlman:
It was widely believed that the patent office was more liberal in
construing the standard for a valid patent than were the District
Courts and the Courts of Appeal, and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeal was part of the application process. Thus in
transferring jurisdiction to review the validity of patents from the
Courts of Appeal to the Federal Circuit, there was an implicit
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
14. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
15. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, in 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 23 (West
1954).
16. RICHARD L. GAusEwrrz, PATENT PENDING 46 (1983).
17. Federico, supra note 15, at 22-23. For additional historical examinations of the
evolution from a strict test of invention to section 103, see the collection of essays in part I of
NONOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John F. Witherspoon
ed., 1978).
18. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127.
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message that Congress would not particularly mind if the stan-
dard of patent validity was more generous to patents. Decisions
of the Federal Circuit have been consistent with that
implication. 19
Congress's choice of a relaxed standard of patentability opened
the possibility that some market available inventions could receive
patent protection. An examination of the economic underpinnings
of the patent system demonstrates that Congress's choice of a re-
laxed standard of patentability was appropriate.
III. THE ECONOMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM:
EXTENDING PATENT PROTECTION TO MARKET
AVAILABLE INVENTIONS
Many legal scholars have analyzed the economic underpin-
nings of the United States patent system. The early literature
tended to focus upon the patent law's role in creating proper incen-
tives for invention.20 More recent literature has focused upon the
patent law's role in assisting the commercial exploitation of inven-
tions.21 Both approaches indicate that patent protection should be
extended to some market available inventions.
A. The Incentive Purpose
The first principal function of the patent system is to create
incentives for the development of new products. Were an inventor
unable to recoup the costs of her early failures by enjoying a limited
monopoly on her successes, she would have little reason to try in
the first place. The patent incentive is thus needed so that the first
developer of a product may recover development costs which later
manufacturers could avoid by free-riding off the inventor's work.
Traditionally, the patent law focused upon preventing later
manufacturers from free-riding an inventor's discovery of how to
make a new product. But only with non-market inventions do in-
ventors spend significant resources to hurdle this obstacle. With
market available inventions, large numbers of skilled mechanics al-
ready know (or can routinely discover) how to make new products.
Accordingly, those who develop market available inventions often
19. EDMUND W. KITCH AND HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PRoCESS 748-749 (3d ed. 1986).
20. See, eg., Morris D. Forkosch, The Economics ofAmerican Patent Law, in CONTEM.
PORARY LAW PAMPHLETS, No. 2 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law Series No. 4, 1940).
21. See, eg., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L.
& ECON. 265 (1977).
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face only increased production costs-costs which are borne by all
who are interested in producing the new product.
For instance, John Hotchkiss22 likely did not expend great re-
sources in discovering how to make ceramic door knobs, since the
basic manufacturing method was the same as was used for metal
door knobs. Rather, he likely spent his money in retooling his plant
to produce ceramic knobs, but these retooling costs were borne by
his competitors as well. John Hotchkiss simply did not suffer from
the free-rider problem, and he accordingly did not need a patent law
incentive to provide the market with his new type of door knobs.
By focusing upon an inventor's costs of discovering how to make
new products, the early patent law could thus rationally limit patent
protection to non-market inventions.
Increasingly in a technologically advanced society, however,
technicians may know how to make a new product, but may none-
theless face development costs which others may free-ride. Con-
sider that a known antihistamine has undesirable side effects which
a pharmaceutical company believes can be avoided. It may be that
five new but routinely developed alternative drugs have a similar
chemical structure, leading the company's researchers to believe
that these alternatives would also act as effective antihistamines.
Everyone in the drug industry knows how to make a better
drug-develop and test the five chemical alternatives and see which
works best. The advance is thus market available, for it can be
made by any of a number of technicians in the drug manufacturing
industry. The problem, however, is that only the first manufacturer
must develop and test all five alternatives. Later competitors can
free-ride off the original company's efforts to determine which alter-
native works best. It thus often makes economic sense to provide
patent incentives for inventors to develop even market available
inventions.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has re-
cently addressed this issue. In In re Fine,23 the court reversed the
Patent and Trademark Office's determination that a device to mea-
sure minute quantities of nitrogen compounds was obvious. The
device was similar to a previously known method for converting
nitrogen compounds into nitrogen dioxide, a chemiluminescent
compound whose luminescence could be measured to show the level
of the original nitrogen compounds. The Patent and Trademark
Office thought it would have been "obvious to try" the substitution
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
23. 837 F.2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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and combination of known devices, and that the device was thus
obvious under § 103.
The appellate court did not disagree that the substitution
might have been obvious to try, but rather held that "whether a
particular combination might be 'obvious to try' is not a legitimate
test of patentability." The court required that the resulting combi-
nation be suggested by "then-accepted wisdom in the art" to be ob-
vious - and hindsight (especially in light of subsequent success of a
given combination attempt) could not be used to establish the obvi-
ousness of the combination.24
If a given advance is obvious to try, it follows that it can be
developed by any skilled technicians in the industry who are willing
to proceed with the try. By extending patent protection to inven-
tions that are obvious to try, the court properly allowed some mar-
ket available inventions to be patented.25
B. The Commercial Exploitation Purpose
A second purpose served by the patent system, first addressed
by Professor Kitch,26 is to assist the commercial exploitation of new
products. The costs of making new products available to consum-
ers, he argues, will be most efficiently expended if a central patent
holder directs the steps to full commercial exploitation. Consider
the drug manufacturer who has developed a new antihistamine.
Without the monopoly provided by a patent, this manufacturer and
other manufacturers would, at the same time, all be seeking govern-
ment approval for the new drug; all of the manufacturers would
simultaneously prepare and submit safety and efficacy reports; all of
the manufacturers would simultaneously begin advertising cam-
paigns to inform consumers of the new medical advance. Professor
Kitch argues that a single manufacturer can most efficiently coordi-
nate these startup costs, and that the patent law monopoly effi-
ciently assigns control over the startup process to a single
manufacturer.
Consequently, an important patentability factor is how much
more work must be done to bring a new product to the marketplace.
This inquiry can often suggest that market available inventions
should be patented. As Professor Kitch illustrates in his discussion
24. Id. at 1075.
25. See also Betram I. Rowland, Obvious to Try.-A Nonstandard of Patentability, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 17, at
7:201.
26. Kitch, supra note 21.
[Vol. 8
PATENTING IMPROVEMENTS
of the Supreme Court case of Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc27:
The invention was for an automated system of cleaning waste
from dairy barns.... If one looks at this patent from the perspec-
tive of the reward [incentive] function, one sees an unimaginative
application of the natural forces of water, controlled by known
automation devices, to move cow droppings from one point to
another. The Supreme Court conceived of the question to be de-
cided as: Is this worth a monopoly?28
Concluding that the automated barn cleaning system was merely
"the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor," the
Supreme Court refused to grant a patent monopoly for the new de-
vice.29 The barn cleaning system was, in other words, a market
available advance which did not require patent law incentives to be
developed. Nonetheless, Professor Kitch argues that the patent for
the barn cleaning device should have been upheld:
If one looks from the perspective of the prospect function, one
sees all the problems of designing and marketing a reliable, dura-
ble, and efficient system for automatic barn cleaning. Imagine
the reaction of the first dairy farmer approached with the sugges-
tion that he should make a large investment to equip his barn
with pumps, pipes, hoses, nozzles, automatic controls and spe-
cially designed sloping floors to keep it clean. Imagine the costs
involved in designing a commercially acceptable system, proving
its value to the dairy farmers of America, and inducing them to
pay its cost? The investments to achieve these objectives will be
more efficiently made if the patent is held valid.30
In a modem industrial society, newly developed products may
face an array of obstacles before they reach consumer shelves. The
costs of safety testing to meet government standards, the costs of
modem marketing techniques and the costs of carefully refining
products to meet consumer tastes are just some of the burdens that
27. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
28. Kitch, supra note 21, at 284.
29. Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 279 (citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851)).
30. Kitch, supra note 21, at 284; see also Dorr Co. v. Yabucoa Sugar Co., 119 F.2d 521
(Ist Cir. 1941), where the court recognized the extensive time and effort expended by an
inventor, after developing a product, to convince consumers of the products' benefits. The
court wrote:
It is not surprising that sugar manufacturers should have hesitated to
scrap existing installations and methods conceded to have been commercially
successful, until the claimed economies and increased efficiency resulting from
the use of [the claimed invention] should have been demonstrated by quite
extensive experiments.
Id. at 524.
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today's inventors face after developing a new product. Both non-
market inventions and market available inventions face these obsta-
cles, however. Consequently, the commercial exploitation purpose
served by the patent laws also suggests that patent protection
should extend even to market available inventions.
In summary, Congress's desire to expand patent protection, its
choice of a looser standard of nonobviousness, the economic under-
pinnings of the patent system and recent case law all suggest that,
under § 103, even market available inventions should be patentable.
Since § 103 also delineates the breadth of patent protection, this
looser standard of patentability creates economic costs as well.
IV. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF PATENTING MARKET
AVAILABLE INVENTIONS: A NEW CODE SECTION IS
NEEDED To DELINEATE PATENT SCOPE
Bilateral monopolies, a common economic cost, occur when
two or more persons find that they must deal solely with each other
to take advantage of a beneficial transaction.31 The time and energy
spent in settlement negotiations provide an example of bilateral mo-
nopoly costs familiar to most attorneys.
As discussed below, in the patent system, bilateral monopolies
occur whenever the level of patent protection is too broad or too
narrow. The level of protection afforded to a patent, however, is
currently governed by the availability of new patents; one inventor's
patent ends where another's patent may begin. This creates
problems when an inventor finds that another has patented an im-
provement to his invention, and the two must deal solely with each
other to place the improved product on consumer shelves.
Accordingly, as courts permit greater numbers of patents to be
issued under § 103, they also decrease the protection afforded to
existing patents, and create unnecessary bilateral monopoly costs.
A. The Optimal Level of Patent Protection
A quick examination of the bilateral monopoly problems en-
countered by the patent system reveals the optimal level of patent
protection: an inventor's patent monopoly should extend to all
market available improvements to his invention.
The first type of bilateral monopoly that the patent system
must confront arises when patent protection extends too far beyond
the inventor's work. For a drastic example, imagine that patent
31. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.7 (3d ed. 1986).
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rights were issued to anyone who filed an idea for a new product.
Jenny Q. Public could file a patent for a three dimensional television
and, having neither the ability nor desire to develop such an inven-
tion, wait for someone more inventive than she to arrive at her
doorstep to purchase, after much haggling, her patent rights. This
particular bilateral monopoly problem is easily avoided by having a
requirement that a patent application disclose how the claimed in-
vention is made.32
Similarly, if patent protection were allowed to cover signifi-
cantly more than the inventor's specific invention, bilateral dealings
would result. The hornbook case of O'Reilly v. Morse33 provides a
good example. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down one of
Samuel Morse's patent claims for his telegraph invention. Samuel
Morse attempted to claim under his patent all
use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which
I call electromagnetism, however developed for marking or
printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,
being a new application of that power of which I claim to be the
first inventor...34
Had Samuel Morse's claim been upheld, the teletype machine,
the telex machine, cable television, the fax machine, and integrated
computer networks would all have fallen under Morse's patent.
The various inventors of these devices would have found themselves
haggling with Mr. Morse over appropriate licensing fees.35 This
problem led an early court to proclaim:
A claim broader than the actual invention of the patentee is, for
that very reason, upon principle of the common law, utterly void,
and the patent is a nullity.36
A patent system should not, however, shrinkwrap patent pro-
tection around an invention, for then a different form of bilateral
dealing arises. For example, if protection were narrowly tran-
scribed, the inventor of the electric refrigerator might fall prey to
the first person to conceive of, and patent a method for, separating
the refrigerator into two independently regulated insulated com-
partments-the refrigerator/freezer. The classic bilateral monop-
oly would arise because neither of the parties could manufacture
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1992).
33. 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
34. Id. at 85.
35. This example is designed merely to illustrate the bilateral monopolies that arise
from overly broad patent rights. The limited duration of Mr. Morse's patent is thus ignored.
36. Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C. Mass 1840)(No. 18,107).
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and sell the improved unit without the other's consent; the later
inventor would indeed be building a refrigerator and would thus,
without license, infringe the original patent, while the original in-
ventor could not sell the improved product without infringing the
other's patent.
These examples illustrate some of the intuitive force behind the
early law's focus on the sporadic genius behind inventions. Because
inventions were viewed as being sporadic, the courts could not ex-
pect Samuel Morse to discover all of the future advances in electro-
magnetic transmission of data. His patent claim thus had to be
limited, or bilateral dealings would result when later inventors
made these advances. Consequently, the law made the facial asser-
tion that a patent could cover no more than the actual invention. 7
At the same time, however, the courts could expect an inventor
to make on her own any market available improvements to her in-
vention. Consequently, to prevent blocking patents and the ensuing
bilateral monopoly costs, the law refused to allow others to patent
these improvements.3" By finding that these improvements lacked
the genius of invention, the courts provided the necessary breathing
space for an inventor to fully exploit all market available improve-
ments to her invention.39
Because the patent law does not differentiate between new in-
ventions and improvements to existing inventions, § 103 indirectly
determines the amount of breathing space afforded to a new inven-
tor. Under the current system, an inventor can fully exploit only
those improvements which others do not patent. Accordingly, if
the law recognizes a strict non-obviousness standard that creates
the proper scope of patent protection-one that allows inventors to
make all market available improvements themselves-then other
market available inventions will be denied patent protection. Alter-
natively, if § 103 is broadly interpreted to allow the proper eco-
nomic incentives for invention and commercial exploitation,' then
bilateral dealings will result when market available improvements
are patented. As revealed in the case law concerning combination
patents, the law has struggled unsatisfactorily to deal with this
problem.
37. Id.
38. See discussion supra part I.
39. This approach still allows inventors to patent truly unique (non-market) improve-
ments on another's invention. And while blocking patents could thus still arise, the benefit of
having a new advance that would otherwise remain unfound would most certainly outweigh
the bilateral monopoly costs.
40. See discussion supra part III.
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B. Combination Patents
A combination device is an assembly of previously known
products to create a new unit.4 Combination devices are thus a
unique type of product improvement, and the patent law's approach
to combination devices reveals some of the costs that arise when
improvements are treated like other inventions.
Because combination devices do not contain new elements,
some courts, prior to the enactment of § 103, saw in these devices a
lack of the sporadic genius of invention needed for patentability.
For example, in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp.,42 the claimed invention was a grocery counter
equipped with a rack for moving groceries from the customer to the
clerk. The court held the invention unpatentable, establishing what
subsequently became known as the synergism test:43
The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute
something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of
its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable.
44
The absence of such synergism, the court reasoned, displayed an
absence of invention.45
When Congress enacted § 103 in 1952, it appeared to sweep
aside such searches for invention.4" And the first Supreme Court
cases decided after § 103 was enacted bolstered this view.47 In Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. 48 and United States v. Adams,49 the Supreme
Court addressed the patentability of two combination devices. In
Deere, the claimed invention was an improvement to a plow made
by reversing the placement of a hinge plate. All of the elements of
the invention were the same as before."0 In Adams, the inventor
had made a battery having cuprous chloride and magnesium elec-
41. See Carson Mfg. Co. v. Carsonite Intern. Corp., 686 F.2d 665, 667-68 (9th Cir.
1981).
42. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
43. The Supreme Court first phrased its inquiry in terms of synergism in Anderson's-
Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969). On synergism generally,
see James W. Geriak, Synergism-The Artificial Barrier to Patentability, in NONOBVIOUS-
NESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY, supra note 17, at 7:301.
44. Great Atlantic, 340 U.S. at 152.
45. Id. at 152-54.
46. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
47. See Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents,
1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 293. Professor Kitch concluded that "only the [non-obviousness test]
survives the decision in Deere." Id at 297.
48. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
49. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
50. Graham, 383 U.S. at 23.
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trodes. Although the two types of electrodes had never before been
used together, they were both used separately in other batteries.51
The invention contained no new elements. The Supreme Court de-
cided both cases by referring to § 103, looking for: the scope and
content of the prior art; differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; and the ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 2 Appar-
ently content with the nonobviousness test in § 103, the court did
not search for synergism, and it did not delve into the metaphysics
of invention.
But three years later the Supreme Court resurrected the syner-
gism test in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,"
a case which involved the validity of a patent on a paving machine
which combined in one unit a specific kind of radiant heater and a
bituminous concrete paving machine.54 The combination was able
to solve a long standing road deterioration problem caused by the
cold joint between a road section being laid, and the previously laid
section. In striking down the claimed patent, the Court reverted
to its pre-section 103 inquiry. The Court wrote:
A combination of elements may result in an effect greater than
the sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergis-
tic result is argued here. It is, however, fervently argued that the
combination filled a long felt want and has enjoyed commercial
success. But those matters "without invention will not make
patentability." 56
And again in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,57 as discussed above, the
Court struck down a patent on a barn cleaning system that used the
well-known elements of flush troughs, a sloping floor and a water
storage tank. The Court again invoked the language of synergism,
finding that the lack of synergism was likewise a lack of patentable
invention.5 9
The Supreme Court's contrasting approaches to combination
patents wreaked confusion in the patent bar, and rekindled judicial
inquiries into the metaphysics of patentable invention. The Court's
51. Adams, 383 U.S. at 51-52.
52. Deere, 383 U.S. at 17; Adams, 383 U.S. at 51-52.
53. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
54. Id. at 58.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 61 (citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. at 153).
57. 425 U.S. 273.
58. Id. at 275-76 & n.2.
59. Id. at 281-82.
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rulings created a split amongst the circuit courts' that lasted until
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
which finally replaced the circuit cacophony with national unity.61
But the apparent inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's decisions
remain unresolved.
A closer examination of the circumstances surrounding Ander-
son's-Black Rock, however, helps explain the Court's stricter treat-
ment of patentability in that case, and further demonstrates the
need for a new approach to patent protection.
The heart of Pavement Salvage's claimed invention was a spe-
cial type of propane-fired radiant heater which was then attached to
a standard paver. The heater allowed highway builders to effec-
tively fuse new patches of road with previously laid segments by
heating the joint during paving.62 While this method had been tried
before, the earlier heaters either damaged the road or were too inef-
ficient. Pavement Salvage's machine was indeed the first to elimi-
nate what was known as the cold joint problem.63
Significantly, the type of heater incorporated into Pavement
Salvage's paving machine was new on the market and had itself
been recently patented. Pavement Salvage used a Schwank heater,
patented by Gunther Schwank in 1956. 64 The patent on Pavement
Salvage'.s machine was filed by Charlie Nelville only three years
later, in early 1959. In fact, Mr. Nelville's lawyer had begun work
on the patent application for the paving machine in 1957, approxi-
mately only one year after the Schwank patent issued.65
Looking at the case not from Charlie Nelville's perspective, but
rather from Gunther Schwank's position, we see the inventor of a
highly useful and efficient radiant heater finding that others are
quickly patenting ways to use his invention-uses that he could
have discovered and exploited himself. Had the Court sustained
Nelville's patent, Gunther Schwank would have found himself
locked in the familiar bilateral monopoly. Pavement Salvage would
have been dependent upon him for supplying them with heaters,
60. The various approaches taken by the Courts of Appeal are reviewed in Kevin J.
Lake, Synergism and Nonobviousness: The Rhetorical Rubik's Cube of Patentability, 24 B.C.
L. REv. 697, 716 nn.130 & 136 (1983).
61. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1555-57 (Fed. Cir. 1985), asserting
that there is no synergism requirement.
62. Anderson's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 58-59.
63. Pavement Salvage Co. v. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., 404 F.2d 450, 450-51 (4th
Cir. 1969).
64. Id. at 452.
65. RICHARD L. GAUSEWrrZ, PATENT PENDING 111-12 (1983).
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while he would have been unable to sell his heater to any paving
companies without routing them through Pavement Salvage
Company.
Combination patents come in two types. They can, like the
one in Anderson's-Black Rock, act as blocking patents on previous
inventions. In such instances, the law has already granted a patent
monopoly to the underlying inventor-a monopoly that should pro-
vide sufficient incentives for the underlying inventor to develop all
market available improvements to his invention. Further, if a com-
bination patent is allowed to coexist with an underlying patent, so-
ciety no longer benefits from the cost savings of having a central
patent holder coordinate the commercial exploitation of the inven-
tion. 6 In these circumstances, granting a patent to the inventor of
a market available combination device only creates unnecessary
costs.
Combination patents can also be issued to inventors who use
old elements in new ways without encroaching on existing patents.
As such, these patents perform the same economic functions as all
other patents, and should be governed by the general rules for non-
obviousness. These two patterns may help explain the two ap-
proaches to synergism that dominated the patent law in the 1960's
and 1970's.
As we have seen, § 103's standard for determining when a pat-
ent is available also indirectly governs the protection afforded to
existing patents. This dual role creates unnecessary bilateral mo-
nopoly costs, as inventors must haggle with those who improve
their inventions to coordinate their joint property rights in the im-
proved invention.
The current framework for patenting inventions, however,
leaves little room for differently treating claims for improvements
on existing patented inventions, and those for other inventions.
Section 101 of the patent act specifically includes in the category of
patentable advances "any new and useful improvement. ' 67 A statu-
tory addition to the patent act, however, would correct the
problems identified in this article.
C. Proposal: A New Code Section
Proposed Section 105. Patent Scope.
For a period of seven years after the Commissioner properly is-
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
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sues a patent to an inventor, the inventor shall have the exclusive
right to claim, by filing notice with the Commissioner, any im-
provements upon and novel uses of her invention which would be
routinely ascertainable after diligent search by one skilled in the
art to which the invention pertains. Any claim made under this
section shall become a part of the originally issued patent.
This, or a similar statute, would correct the flaws that this arti-
cle has found in the current patent system. By granting to the in-
ventor the exclusive right to claim all "routinely ascertainable"
improvements discoverable after "diligent search," the proposal al-
lows an inventor to fully exploit all market available improvements
to her invention, while leaving room for others to patent non-mar-
ket improvements which the original inventor cannot be expected to
find. As we have seen, this eliminates unnecessary bilateral
monopolies.
Additionally, by assigning the patent rights for market avail-
able improvements to a central patent holder, the proposed statute
would prevent the unnecessary costs of having multiple inventors
simultaneously rushing to develop market available improvements.
Under the proposed section, the inventor of a new product could
alone develop, at the most efficient pace,68 all market available im-
provements to her invention.69
Society would benefit by the cost savings of having a single in-
ventor efficiently working to develop market available improve-
ments even if the inventor of a new product lacked the ambition to
herself develop the market available improvements to her invention.
Because patent claims are publicly fied,7 6 those more ambitious
than the original inventor could easily contact the inventor,
purchase her patent rights, and develop the improvements them-
selves. Alternatively, more ambitious inventors could seek a li-
cense, or simply sell their services to the initial inventor.71 In all
instances, because of the large number of other inventors who could
develop market available improvements,72 the transaction costs
would not be high; if a potential licensee was unreasonable, for ex-
68. Because the proposed statute provides only a seven year safe harbour, an inventor
would still confront the diseconomies of speed for improvements which would otherwise take
longer than seven years to develop.
69. See Kitch, supra note 21, and the accompanying discussion, supra part III(B).
70. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1991).
71. This is an application of the Coase Theorem, which posits that regardless of its
initial assignment, a property right will be transferred to its optimum use (in the absence of
prohibitive transaction costs, such as bilateral monopolies.) See Ronald H. Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). See also POSNER, supra note 31, at 7, 43-45.
72. See discussion supra part I.
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ample, the initial inventor could find someone else, or simply de-
velop the market available improvements herself.
Further, by limiting the protection offered for improvements to
a period of seven years, this proposal ensures that an inventor will
act promptly to develop improvements. The time period also acts
to lessen the costs of incorrectly identifying an improvement as a
market improvement. If an inventor cannot develop an improve-
ment within seven years, it makes sense to presume that the im-
provement is a non-market improvement that should be patentable
notwithstanding the potential bilateral monopolies.7"
Finally, by providing that claims made under the section be-
come part of the original patent, the section prevents an inventor
from repeatedly extending her statutory monopoly by filing im-
provement claims. This approach again gives an inventor an incen-
tive to make all improvements as quickly as possible-an approach
that will directly benefit consumers.
CONCLUSION
The patent law has long viewed inventions as coming in two
types: market available inventions and non-market inventions.
While patent protection properly extends to some market available
inventions, if patent improvements are not regulated separately
from § 103, bilateral monopolies will result. Because our current
patent system treats patent improvements like all other patents, the
case law has floundered in confusion. It is time for Congress to
enact a separate statutory provision to help govern patent
improvements.
73. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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